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Using a new database of World Bank loans to support financial sector development, we 
investigate whether countries that received such loans experienced more rapid growth on 
standard indicators of financial development than countries that did not. We account for 
self-selection with treatment effects regressions, and we also use propensity score 
matching techniques. Our results indicate that borrowing countries had significantly more 
rapid growth in M2/GDP than non-borrowers, and swifter reductions in interest rate 
spreads and cash holdings (as a share of M2). Borrowers also had higher private credit 
growth rates than non-borrowers in treatment effects regressions, but not in standard 
panel regressions with fixed country effects. On the whole, however, the results indicate 
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  1. Introduction 
 
  Did the financial sectors of developing countries that received assistance from the 
World Bank perform better than those in countries that did not?  And did the countries 
that received World Bank assistance enjoy more financial sector development than they 
otherwise would have?  Based on financial sector data in the 1990s, the answer to the 
first question appears to be yes.  Despite severe financial crises in multiple countries that 
received World Bank assistance to support financial sector reform (such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Russia), the growth rates for borrowing countries for multiple 
standard measures of financial sector development were greater than for countries that 
did not receive such support.   
A skeptic could argue that such results are driven by selection – aside from a few 
crisis countries that received loans, borrowers tended to be countries that were most apt 
to improve their financial sectors on their own. To answer our second question, whether 
borrowing countries developed their financial sectors more quickly than they otherwise 
would have, we use both treatment effects regressions that explicitly account for self-
selection and propensity score matching techniques. We also offer robustness checks that 
examine whether our findings are specific to a region(s) and whether improvements in 
financial indicators preceded or followed lending projects – if improvement preceded 
those projects, it would seem unlikely that they had a large causal impact in borrowing 
countries. However, these multiple estimation techniques provide evidence that 
reinforces our main findings.  Borrowing countries tended to experience substantial post-
loan improvement in their financial indicators, significantly more than the typical 
improvement in non-borrowing countries, even after accounting for self-selection.  
This paper contributes to a broader literature on the effects of economic reform 
programs in developing countries. Much of that literature focuses on the impact of IMF 
and World Bank adjustment lending on broad macroeconomic aggregates, most notably 
real per capita growth.
1  Much has been made of selection problems in that literature, and 
                                                 
1 Easterly (2005) describes this literature as including Barro and Lee (2002), Conway (1994), Corbo and 
Goldstein (1987), Corbo and Fischer (1995), Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001), Dicks-Mireaux, 
Mecagni, and Schadler (2000), Goldstein and Montiel (1986), Haque and Khan (1998), Hutchison (2001), 
Kapur, Lewis and Webb (1997), Khan (1990), Killick, Gunatilaka, and Marr (1998), Knight and Santaella   3
thus a substantial share of the papers adopt Heckman-type methods to assess the effects 
of adjustment lending.  A smaller subset uses control group matching techniques and/or 
before and after analysis.  We employ all three types of analysis here.   
There have also been recent attempts to assess the effects of developing country 
policy reform on trade using similar selection techniques (see for example, Lederman and 
Ozden, 2004 and Jinjarik, Salinas, and Tsikata, 2004). As in trade, where specific 
indicators exist to assess outcomes such as the ratios of imports and exports to GDP, 
outcomes in the financial sector can be assessed via standard indicators such as the ratio 
of M2 or private credit to GDP.  However, in the trade literature it has been easier to 
pinpoint specific reform episodes tied to trade agreements and legislative actions.
2  In the 
financial sector, where reform efforts often were carried out under broader multi-sector 
adjustment projects, and thus are harder to identify, little empirical work has been done.
3  
We therefore rely on a comprehensive database of financial sector reforms, including 
both financial sector adjustment loans and multi-sector adjustment loans with financial 
sector components, that was recently put together by the World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department (OED). 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data, 
including the indicators that we use to assess outcomes and the variables that summarize 
World Bank lending to support financial sector reform from 1992 to 2003.  Section 3 
describes the basic regression models and section 4 summarizes the base results. Section 
5 presents results from two methods that address self-selection problems that could be 
affecting the base results. Section 6 offers additional robustness checks, including 
regional regressions and models that test whether improvements in financial indicators 
came before or after World Bank loans were received.  Section 7 concludes with a brief 
summary of the results from the various methods.  
                                                                                                                                                 
(1997), Summers and Pritchett (1993), Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), Svensson (2003), and Van de 
Walle (2001). 
2 In addition to Lederman and Ozden (2004) and Jinjarik et al. (2004), see Santos-Paulino and Thirlwell 
(2004) and Wacziarg and Welch (2003).  
3 Cull (2000) uses before and after analysis, but only for countries that received financial adjustment loans.   4
  2. Data 
To assess outcomes in borrowing countries we rely on standard indicators such as 
M2/GDP and Private Credit/GDP that have been shown to be robustly associated with 
long-run economic growth (Levine, 2005; Beck, Loayza, and Levine, 2000; Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck, 2000).
4 We restrict our analysis to banking indicators because banks 
hold the vast majority of financial sector assets in developing countries.
5 An advantage of 
these indicators is that they are available for many countries throughout the decade. They 
do, however, carry some limitations.  For example, in an effort to restructure and sell 
problem banks, many non-performing assets might be written down in value or 
eliminated from bank balance sheets, resulting in a reduction in the private credit ratio. If 
performed well, such restructuring efforts contribute to a healthier banking sector.   
However, because of the reduction in private credit, these actions would be viewed as 
subtracting from financial development in our models.  
In addition, the private credit ratio does not provide information about which 
segments of society receive credit, nor the quality of the loans that are made because data 
on non-performing loans are not available on a standardized basis across countries.   
Because the M2/GDP ratio also does not provide information on depositors, 
improvements on it do not necessarily imply that all segments of society are availing 
themselves of formal banking services. We therefore incorporate additional indicators to 
round out our assessment of financial development. We rely on the spread between 
lending and deposit interest rates, the share of total banking sector assets held by the three 
largest banks as a measure of concentration, and the ratio of cash held outside of banks to 
M2 as a measure of (lack of) confidence in the formal banking sector. Again, these 
indicators were chosen largely because of data availability, and they too have limitations. 
For example, interest rates were controlled in a number of developing countries at some 
point during our sample period, and thus spreads are unlikely to be an accurate measure 
of efficiency in those instances.  Measures of capital adequacy, portfolio quality, and 
                                                 
4 For descriptions of standard indicators of financial development and their use see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Levine (2000).   
5 One of our indicators, the ratio of private credit to GDP, can however include lending by non-bank 
financial institutions.   5
profitability, while desirable, are simply not available in a standard format across 
countries.  
Caveats aside, it seems likely that our five indicators – M2/GDP, Private 
Credit/GDP, Cash/M2, interest spreads, and concentration – provide a reasonably 
complete picture of financial sector development since 1992. Note also that the indicators 
are differentially suited to capturing short versus long-term financial development. On the 
one extreme, movements in the ratio of cash/M2 can provide a summary of depositors’ 
short-term reactions to policy changes. On the other end of the spectrum, the private 
credit ratio and the concentration ratio, while both admittedly subject to some short-term 
perturbations, tend to capture long-term financial development. M2/GDP and spreads are, 
arguably, somewhere in between the two extremes. Taken together, the five indicators are 
likely to provide a more complete picture of both long-term and short-term banking 
development. 
  While the financial outcome variables that we use are standard within the finance 
and growth literature, our data on World Bank projects to support financial reform are 
not.  The World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED) has recently compiled 
a comprehensive database of 556 projects from 1992 to 2003 in which an intention to 
reform the financial sector was expressed. These projects include loans for adjustment, 
technical assistance, or lines of credit (LOC).
6  We focus our analysis on adjustment 
loans because these tended to be larger (in dollar terms), with conditionality attached to 
specific financial reforms, but aimed at broad financial sector development.  By contrast, 
LOC often focused on channeling funds through specific financial institution(s), while 
technical assistance loans tended to be much smaller than adjustment loans, and focused 
on more narrow issues. The Appendix lists the 68 countries that received at least one 
adjustment loan with conditions tied to financial reform.  As noted, these are either pure 
financial sector adjustment loans or multi-sector adjustment loans with financial sector 
components. A control group of 38 countries identified as having received no such loans 
is also listed. Our goal was to include all developing countries that had reasonably 
                                                 
6 Lines of credit (LOC) are funds passed through an intermediary, for demand driven purposes, where the 
final end-user has to repay the loan, usually with interest.   6
complete financial indicator data in the analysis. Comparisons between the two groups 
form the basis of most of the statistical analysis that follows.
7  
  3. Methodology 
  For our base results, we rely on simple fixed-effects panel regressions of the 
following form:  
 
Yit = αi + βwbt + βno-wbt + β1adjit + β2refit + β3Xit + εit        (1) 
 
where i represents country, and t is time measured in years since 1991.  The time variable 
takes values from one to twelve, and the estimated coefficient βwb thus represents the 
average growth rate for indicator of financial development Y for countries that received 
adjustment loans to supports financial reform.  We test whether βwb =βnon-wb to assess 
whether adjustment loans had a beneficial impact on financial sector development.  To 
the extent that the growth rates for the control countries were the same as (or greater 
than) those for those that received World Bank assistance, the value of that assistance 
would be questioned. All regressions also include αi, a country-specific fixed effect.  Our 
results, therefore, should be interpreted as changes relative to the country-specific mean 
for the indicator in question. Later we offer additional, more direct methods for 
addressing potential selection problems. 
  X is a vector of macroeconomic and institutional controls that includes inflation, 
real growth, government budget surplus(-deficit)/GDP and the CPIA index, a broad 
measure of institutional development. CPIA is the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment done annually by the World Bank to assess the quality of a country’s present 
policy and institutional framework.  The index is based on twenty criteria, which are 
grouped in four clusters: economic management; structural policies; policies for social 
inclusion and equity; and public sector management and institutions.  All of the 
macroeconomic and institutional controls are lagged one year in the panel regressions 
that follow to help mitigate problems arising from the controls and the dependent variable 
being simultaneously determined. 
                                                 
7 A number of the countries in the control group received non-lending services in the sense that the World 
Bank maintained a policy dialogue with them throughout the period.  A number also had received some 
loans for financial sector reform prior to our period of study.  These factors could make it harder to find 
statistically significant differences between the two groups in the regressions that follow.   7
Ref is a vector of variables summarizing ten reform areas covered under the 
adjustment loans (bank privatization, bank regulation and supervision, banking reform 
not focused on privatization, regulation or supervision, auditing and accounting reform, 
capital market development, reform of non-bank financial institutions, general financial 
sector reform, rural finance, microfinance, and access to finance for SMEs). Because we 
have a country-level panel of financial sector outcomes, we need to aggregate the project-
level data into country-year reform packages.  In the regressions that follow, we use the 
cumulative number of loans that had conditions in the policy areas in question as 
explanatory variables.
8 In some specifications, we also include adj, the cumulative 
number of adjustment loans.  Easterly (2005) finds that repeated structural adjustment 
lending from either the World Bank or the IMF failed to produce improvement on 
multiple macroeconomic outcomes including growth. We assess whether similar results 
hold for the financial sector. As with the macroeconomic and institutional variables, all 
policy reform variables are lagged one year in the regressions. 
  4. Results 
  The base regressions indicate that the relative performance of borrowers and non-
borrowers varies across indicators (Table 2).  Borrowers had more rapid growth in 
M2/GDP and more rapid declines in Cash/M2 and interest spreads, all signs of better 
financial development.  The difference, however, was only significant for Cash/M2 and 
spreads. This pattern holds when macro/institutional controls and the policy reform 
variables are included in the regressions. By contrast, the results for reduction in 
concentration favor borrowers without controls or policy variables (model 2.13) and non-
borrowers when those variables are introduced (models 2.14, 2.15).  Note however that 
the number of observations is cut drastically when the controls are introduced, which is 
due to the government deficits variable. There is no significant difference between 
declines in concentration for borrowers and non-borrowers when we exclude that variable 
from models 2.14 and 2.15.  To preserve degrees of freedom, the deficits variable is 
excluded from many of the robustness checks that follow. 
                                                 
8 Similar qualitative results obtain when we use the current number of loans in a given year covering that 
policy area or simple dummies indicating that a policy area is currently covered, or dummies indicating that 
it was covered at some point during the sample period.   8
   At first glance, the most alarming finding is that private credit grew significantly 
faster in non-borrowing than in borrowing countries.  However, private credit growth was 
positive and significant for borrowers in all specifications, which might come as a 
surprise given the number of borrowers that suffered financial crises during the period 
(see Appendix for list of borrowers).  In addition, the estimated growth rate jumps to 1.0 
percentage points per year when the policy controls are included, likely because certain 
types of reform curtail credit growth over the short to medium term. For example, 
reforms aimed at improving bank regulation and supervision were associated with 
substantial reductions in the private credit ratio (7 percentage points per adjustment loan).  
This could be because those reforms forced banks to reduce the reported values of 
nonperforming assets, which would have improved the health of the banking sector. 
    Improvements were largest on those indicators that are (arguably) better suited 
to capturing short- and medium-term financial sector development (cash/M2, spreads, 
and M2/GDP).  Therefore, it could be argued that sufficient time yet had not elapsed to 
see the full effects of reform on private credit and concentration for borrowers.  That does 
not explain, however, why borrowers would perform worse than non-borrowers over this 
period.  On private credit, we provide a series of tests below indicating that selection is 
likely driving the result in Table 2 – borrowers came to the World Bank, in part, because 
they were relatively less likely than non-borrowers to generate private credit growth on 
their own.   
On concentration, non-borrowers do not consistently outperform borrowers across 
the multiple tests that follow, and so we are less concerned about borrower performance 
on that dimension.  Moreover, very recent research (Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine, 
2005; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005; and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine, 2003)  demonstrates that standard concentration measures are not robustly 
associated with sector outcomes such as spreads or access to credit and are positively 
associated with stability (i.e., a lower likelihood of systemic crisis).  Therefore, reducing 
concentration should not be a high priority in World Bank operations.  Indeed, the most 
important determinants of financial sector outcomes from those regressions were 
contestability (as measured by fewer restrictions on entry), ownership (with foreign 
offering benefits and state imposing costs), and general measures of institutional quality.     9
The base results summarize percentage point changes in financial indicators, thus 
model 2.3 indicates that M2/GDP increased by 1.9 percentage points per year for the 
typical borrower.
9  However, a 1.9 percentage point change is much more important for a 
country starting with M2/GDP equal to 5% than one starting with 50%.  To measure 
percentage changes in our indicators, we take their logs and re-run our base specifications 
(Table 3).  Results are qualitatively similar, except that the improvement in M2/GDP is 
significantly larger for borrowers than non-borrowers (5% versus 3%), and there is now 
no statistical difference between the two groups on concentration.  One potentially 
troubling change is that private credit growth rates for borrowers are no longer 
significantly different from zero in the models with control variables.  However, that is 
due to the inclusion of the deficits variable.  When that variable is excluded, the number 
of observations is over 700 (with 93 countries), and the borrower growth rate is positive 
and significant (3% per year).   
The private credit growth rate for non-borrowers still remains significantly larger 
than for borrowers when the deficits variable is dropped, but this could be because the 
non-borrower growth rates are ‘too high.’  Note that private credit growth rates are over 
twice as large as M2/GDP growth rates for non-borrowers.  Over a short period, this 
might be possible, but over longer periods this is unlikely to be sustainable, and likely to 
be destabilizing. Multiple recent papers indicate that rapid growth in indicators of 
financial depth, particularly those related to credit, can be so destabilizing that they lead 
to crisis (Honohan, 2004; Loayza and Ranciere 2004; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998).
10  By contrast, the growth rates for borrowers 
(3% for private credit/GDP compared with 4-5% for M2/GDP) seem more reasonable.
11   
Finally, the control variables tend to be associated with the financial indicators as 
one would expect – lower CPIA scores, and higher inflation and deficits retard financial 
development (Table 2).  Different controls are significant across indicators – CPIA scores 
are important for private credit, deficits for Cash/M2 and spreads, and inflation for all 
three – but the coefficients are generally plausible.  Similarly, different policy reform 
                                                 
9 This is relative to their average value on that indicator because all models in table 2 include fixed country 
effects. 
10 Loayza and Ranciere (2004) demonstrate that a positive long-run relationship between financial depth 
and growth coexists with a mostly negative short-run relationship.  
11 The point estimates are from models that include control variables except for deficits.   10
variables are significant across indicators, and the same variable can be positively or 
negatively associated with financial development depending on the indicator.  For 
example, adjustment loans focused on improving bank regulation and supervision were 
linked to higher M2/GDP, but lower private credit and higher spreads.  
While one could conceivably come up with explanations for the patterns of the 
coefficients in Table 2, we prefer not to invest too much effort in that direction.  Our 
policy variables are the best that have been put together to study the effects of reform on 
financial development, but they carry some limitations. First, not all loans that covered a 
policy area did so in the same way.  Some may have devoted substantial resources to that 
area, others relatively few. Second, because our classifications are based in part on the 
objectives stated in the documents describing the loans, we run the risk that we measure 
ex ante indications of planned reform rather than actual ex post reforms.  Therefore, we 
view the policy variables as a set of coarse controls, and we include them to examine 
whether our primary results on borrowers versus non-borrowers hold up. We chose to 
focus on the simplest decision – borrow or not – rather than painstakingly qualifying the 
nature of the reforms to produce variables that were unlikely to explain variation in 
country-level aggregate financial indicators.      
 
  5. Selection Effects 
  The sample of borrowers is unlikely to be random, and one could conceive of the 
selection bias working in either direction. That is, countries with the most potential for 
financial development might prefer to pursue reform on their own, rather than incurring 
World Bank debt and negotiating and adhering to conditionalities.  By contrast, another 
set of countries might be so ill-prepared to achieve financial reform that, even if they 
were to approach the Bank for assistance, it would be highly unlikely that a mutually 
beneficial adjustment loan could be negotiated. Therefore, in the treatment effects 
regressions that follow, we include non-linearities in the selection equation to account for 
these two potential types of countries that are unlikely to seek World Bank assistance. 
  We borrow concepts from the literature on the political economy of IFI lending to 
test whether ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ potential reformers were less likely to receive World 
Bank adjustment loans to promote financial sector development.  Vreeland (2004) argues   11
that reform-minded executives in developing countries use IMF support to help overcome 
opposition to potentially unpopular policies.  The idea is that after the executive reaches 
an agreement with the IMF, failure to achieve reform is more costly because rejection of 
those policies is also seen as a rejection of the IMF, and all domestics politicians and 
interest groups might find it costly to reject the IMF.
12   
Vreeland hypothesizes that an executive’s likelihood of using IMF agreements in 
this way depends on the checks and balances she faces.  Those facing no veto players 
(i.e., dictators) would have no need for IMF support.  Those facing too many are unlikely 
to overcome opposition, despite IMF support.  Thus the IMF would be unwilling to enter 
into agreements with them. In some intermediate range, IMF agreements should be more 
prevalent because they are more likely to achieve the desired objective of overcoming the 
opposition of veto players. We assume that World Bank adjustment loans could serve a 
similar purpose, and the parallel to potentially ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ reformers discussed 
above should be clear.   
To operationalize these concepts, we use data on the number of checks and 
balances stipulated in country constitutions as reported in Beck et al. (2001).  We include 
the number of checks and the squared number of checks in the selection equations that 
follow to test whether Vreeland’s hypotheses are valid for our dataset. We further 
hypothesize that a country’s borrowing needs might affect the likelihood of receiving 
World Bank adjustment loans non-linearly. It is common for developing countries to 
apply proceeds from new World Bank loans to repay old ones. For countries with a 
relatively large stock of World Bank debt, this sort of evergreening would be more likely. 
Beyond some point, however, debt accumulation might become problematic, making 
future agreements less likely. For countries with relatively little past borrowing, 
predictions are more difficult. This could reflect a preference for self-reliance, and thus 
we would expect little future borrowing. Or demand for loans could be cyclical, and thus 
lending would decline during up-cycles and increase during subsequent down-cycles. We 
try a variety of variables measuring countries’ past and current indebtedness and overall 
fiscal health to test these hypotheses.     
                                                 
12 “The IMF may restrict access to loans, it may preclude debt rescheduling with creditors who require an 
IMF arrangement to be in good standing, and decreased investment may result if investors take cues from 
the IMF.” Vreeland (2004), p. 2.   12
a. Treatment Effects Regressions 
  In many Heckman-type selection models, the dependent variable is observable 
only for those individuals (or households or countries) that received the treatment.  In our 
case, indicators of financial development are observable for borrowers and non-
borrowers alike.  We therefore opt for treatment effects models in which: 
  Yi = α + βXi + δZi+ εi    (2) 
where Y is an indicator of financial development and X is the vector of macroeconomic, 
institutional, and policy control variables. Z  is the endogenous treatment variable 
indicating whether or not country i borrowed.  As is typical in this literature, the decision 
to borrow is modeled as the outcome of an unobserved latent variable Z
*, which is a 
function of exogenous covariates W and a random component u: 
Zi* = γWi +  ui          (3) 
We observe: 
  Zi = 1, if Zi*>0           (4) 
  Zi = 0, otherwise 
 
Because there is an element of self-selection in borrowing from the World Bank, and 
because the error term of the model that summarizes this choice (namely, 3) could be 
correlated with the error term in the regression of interest (namely, 2), we must search for 
a set of valid instruments. These instruments should be highly correlated with the 
endogenous regressor (the borrowing dummy), but contemporaneously uncorrelated with 
the error term in (2) (i.e., truly exogenous). 
It is, however, difficult to find exogenous variables that can capture the non-
linearities in borrowing outcomes described above. In particular, it is highly likely that 
proxies for borrowing needs as reflected in measures of countries’ fiscal health and 
indebtedness are themselves endogenous.  The governmental checks variable is less 
susceptible to criticism on these grounds, but those checks tend not to vary over time, and 
thus are not well suited for use as instruments in panel regressions that incorporate 
country fixed effects. 
We therefore use past information on fiscal health and indebtedness in our 
selection equation, which is by definition not contemporaneously correlated with the 
error term in the financial development regressions. Because the hypotheses above   13
centered around the effects of current or past indebtedness on future borrowing, it is 
logical to use past information to predict which countries borrowed during our sample 
period.  However, once we opt for past data to predict whether countries borrowed for 
financial sector development, we cannot estimate a selection effect that varies by year for 
each country. Rather, we estimate the likelihood of receiving at least one adjustment loan 
since 1992 based on information from 1970-1989. For this reason, the subscript t does not 
appear in (2).  Note also that the (time-invariant) checks variable is better suited to the 
cross-sectional regressions. 
  There is another practical reason for cross-sectional regressions. In panel 
regressions with country fixed effects that include a dummy variable for current borrower 
status, all countries that received no loans and all those that had a loan in place 
throughout the period are dropped from the active observation set.  Thus we can draw 
inferences about the effects of adjustment loans only for those countries whose borrowing 
status had changed during the period. Given the large number of countries that never 
borrowed, it seems more sensible to focus first on comparisons between them and those 
that borrowed at some point in the period.  Later, we will offer specifications that attempt 
to link the timing of loans with improvement in the financial indicators of borrowers.  
Although the cross-sectional approach is the more promising one for handling the 
selection problems that we face, we note also that it could put us at a disadvantage in 
finding significant results because standard errors are likely to be larger in regressions 
with relatively few observations. Skeptics of the panel results above could however argue 
that because error terms from multiple observations from the same country are likely to 
be correlated with one another, we really have the same number of independent 
observations as we have countries in the dataset.  Restricting ourselves to the cross-
section of countries therefore could be viewed as an additional test of whether borrowing 
countries have out-performed non-borrowers in terms of financial development. 
  We calculate growth in indicator Y in year t as Yt/Yt-1. We then take the average of 
the yearly growth rates over the whole period for each country to derive one observation 
per indicator per country. Those country averages are used as dependent variables in the 
OLS and treatment effects regressions in Table 4.  The OLS results are similar to those 
from the panel regressions in Table 3, indicating that those results were not solely the   14
product of multiple observations from each country.
13  In particular, M2/GDP grew and 
Cash/M2 declined significantly more rapidly among borrowers.  There was no significant 
difference between borrowers and non-borrowers in terms of concentration (as in models 
3.14 and 3.15 that included controls).  Borrowers’ interest spreads declined at an average 
rate similar to that in Table 3, but the result is not significant in the cross-sectional OLS 
regression, which could be because we have only fifty observations.  Unlike for the panel 
regression in Table 3, borrowers had private credit growth rates on par with those for 
non-borrowers.  
  When we correct for self-selection via the treatment effects model, borrowers 
outperformed non-borrowers by a wider margin.
14 The results for M2 growth (models 
4.2, 4.3) and private credit growth (models 4.5 and 4.6) are particularly striking.  At the 
risk of reading too much into our models, this suggests that the typical bank borrower had 
relatively poor prospects for financial development. Once this is accounted for 
econometrically, the positive effects of World Bank involvement become much more 
pronounced.  Similar results hold for reductions in sector concentration (models 4.14 and 
4.15), although again we put less emphasis on that indicator of financial development. 
  Treatment effects regressions for Cash/M2 are more volatile than those for private 
credit, M2/GDP, and concentration.  In model 4.8, which does not include control 
variables, the borrower dummy is insignificant.  Multiple variables are significant in the 
selection equation, and a likelihood ratio test indicates that the selection and Cash/M2 
equations are independent from one another.   Thus there is no need to perform treatment 
effects regression, and the OLS results are valid.  However, in model 4.9, which includes 
institutional and macroeconomic controls, the borrower dummy is positive and 
significant (indicating less confidence in the financial system).  Although fewer variables 
are significant in the selection equation than in model 4.8, the likelihood ratio test 
indicates that the selection and Cash/M2 equation are not independent, and thus the 
treatment effects results would be preferred over the OLS.  Because the cash/M2 results 
are highly sensitive to slight perturbations in either the selection equation or the equation 
                                                 
13 We use Table 3 for comparison because the growth rates in Table 4 are expressed in percentage terms 
(rather than percentage points, as in Table 2).  
14 All treatment effects models in Table 4 are estimated via maximum likelihood.   15
of primary interest, it is difficult to draw a strong conclusion for that variable based on 
Table 4. 
  In contrast, the selection equations for M2/GDP and concentration produce 
similar coefficients, many of which are significant, and the likelihood ratio test indicates 
that the treatment effects models is preferred to OLS.  In the treatment models, the 
borrower coefficient is nearly identical whether or not controls are included.
15  T h i s  
relatively stable pattern of results lends credibility to the conclusion that borrowing 
countries performed better than non-borrowers on those two dimensions. Significance 
levels in the selection equation for private credit are somewhat lower than for M2/GDP or 
concentration, but the coefficients are similar.  
The coefficients in those selection equations provide support for the hypotheses 
discussed above.  For example, the governmental checks and checks squared coefficients 
indicate that the probability of receiving an adjustment loan increases from one to three 
checks, but declines thereafter (Figure 1). As hypothesized, IFI loans are most likely for 
intermediate levels of checks.  We tried multiple measures of past fiscal health including 
the current account balance, tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, and overall 
government budget balance.  Because we have relatively few observations, we include 
only two such variables – total IMF borrowing and total external debt as a share of GDP, 
both measured from 1970 to 1989 – in our selection equations.  The IMF borrowing 
variable is positive and significant in multiple selection equations, providing support for 
the evergreening hypothesis. The debt and debt squared coefficients indicate that 
countries with low levels of debt in the 1970s and 1980s were more likely to be 
borrowers in our dataset than those with moderate levels of debt (Figure 2), consistent 
with the hypothesis that debt levels might be cyclical.  However, heavily indebted 
countries prior to 1990 were the most likely borrow in our sample, providing additional 
support for the evergreening hypothesis.
16  In sum, the selection equations provide 
plausible results in many of the treatment effects regressions. Those regressions only 
                                                 
15 The deficits variable is dropped from the controls set in the treatment effects models because the 
maximum likelihood estimates did not converge when it was included.  
16 Because we include only a linear and quadratic term for debt in the selection equation, we can not test 
whether the probability of borrowing eventually declines for extreme levels of indebtedness.   16
reinforce our conclusions about the positive association between borrowing and financial 
development. 
b. Propensity Score Matching 
  Another option for facilitating fairer comparisons between borrowers and non-
borrowers is propensity score matching. The intuition underlying this method is that 
certain country types (e.g., the most institutionally sound) are more apt to respond 
favorably to the treatment than others.  To the extent that the control group is more (or 
less) heavily weighted toward types that are less likely to respond favorably, comparisons 
with the treatment group can be misleading.  The propensity matching technique, 
therefore, matches treatment and control observations based on relevant observable 
characteristics. In this way, apples are compared with apples, and oranges with oranges. 
However, it can be difficult to judge a good match when treatment and control group 
observations can be compared on multiple observable dimensions.  Propensity score 
matching can reduce that dimensionality by summarizing the impact of observables in a 
single equation. A standard probability model (logit or probit) is used to estimate the 
conditional probability of receiving the treatment (in our case adjustment loans) given a 
set of covariates. Because the equation is used only to reduce the dimensionality of the 
conditioning, it has no behavioral assumptions attached to it. Thus, unlike in the 
treatment effects regressions, we need not worry about the exogeneity of the covariates. 
Contemporaneous variables can be used, and higher order transformations of those 
variables are also typical. 
Applications of these techniques commonly involve matching a relatively small 
set of treatment observations to a subset of a relatively large pool of non-treatment 
observations. In our case, however, we have only a limited set of non-treatment 
observations since there are only 38 non-borrowers in our sample (see Appendix).
17  
Dehejia and Wahba (2002) demonstrate that in situations where there are very few 
comparable control observations, it is acceptable (even preferable) to match with 
                                                 
17 In principle, it would be possible to increase the number of observations by going back to the panel 
dataset. However, the nearest matching control group observations would almost certainly be from 
borrowing countries in years when no adjustment loan was in place.  As in a fixed effects regression with a 
dummy variable for current borrowing status, this would provide information about only those countries 
that changed their borrowing status throughout the period.   Because we are most interested in comparisons 
with those countries than never borrowed, applying propensity matching to the panel dataset was not 
appropriate.   17
replacement. That is, each treatment observation is matched with the control observation 
with the nearest propensity score, regardless of whether that control observation is also 
the nearest match for another treatment observation.    
Table 5, Panel B offers results from a propensity score equation that we use to 
match each borrower with the most similar non-borrower.  The dependent variable is a 
dummy equal to one if a country borrowed since 1992.  Covariates include CPIA (and its 
square), the M2/GDP level (and its square), total debt service as a percentage of GNI, 
growth in fixed capital formation, and IMF borrowing (in constant dollars).  For each 
country, all of those variables are averaged over 1991 to 2002.  Although we need not 
make any behavioral assumptions about the covariates, the CPIA coefficients do hint at 
the non-linearities found for the treatment effects regressions – that is, borrowing seems 
most likely for countries in the intermediate range.  
We experimented with a variety of covariate groups that produced overall fits 
similar to the equation presented and similarly close matches.  The bottom of Panel B 
summarizes the estimated probability of borrowing conditional on the covariates.  The 
estimated probability for borrowers is much higher than for the un-matched non-borrower 
sample.  By contrast, the estimated propensities for the matched non-borrower sample are 
almost identical to those for the borrower sample. The matching process also brings the 
treatment and control samples closer on most of the macroeconomic variables that we 
have used in regressions (Panel A).   
  Having defined a control group of observations, the next step is to compare its 
outcomes with those for the treatment group (borrowers). Simple averages on the right 
side of Panel A, Table 5 indicate that the matched non-borrowers sample had slower 
growth in M2/GDP (2% versus 4% per year), less reduction in Cash/M2 (+1% versus      
–2% per year) and concentration (–2% versus –3%), and more rapid increase in spreads 
(+5% versus +1%) than borrowers. Matched non-borrowers did, however, have more 
rapid private credit growth (4% versus 3%). The pattern is similar to that found in the 
base results. However, none of those differences is statistically significant, likely because 
we have so few observations. 
  OLS regressions in Panel B,  Table 5 offer comparisons between borrowers and 
matched non-borrowers after including macroeconomic and institutional control   18
variables. Because the matched and borrowers samples differ somewhat along these 
dimensions, these controls could be important (Panel A, left side). Indeed, their inclusion 
produces significant differences in favor of borrowers with respect to growth in M2/GDP 
(model 5.2) and reductions in Cash/M2 (5.6), although these results are also very similar 
to those when the un-matched sample is used. Using the matched sample, borrowers 
enjoyed more reduction in interest spreads than non-borrowers, though the coefficient 
just misses significance (model 5.8).  The coefficient for borrowers in the private credit 
regression is positive (though insignificant) for the matched sample (model 5.4).  For the 
unmatched sample, it was negative and insignificant.  On the whole, matching produces 
results that favor borrowers a bit more strongly than in the base results.  Like the 
treatment effects regressions, this correction reinforces our original findings. 
 
  6. Additional Robustness Checks 
  This section offers a series of robustness checks to test whether (1) improvement 
in financial indicators occurred before or after (or both) receiving World Bank loans and 
(2) our main findings pertain to all regions.  If the findings hold for multiple regions and 
if improvements occurred after the loan programs were adopted, it is more likely that 
World Bank projects contributed to financial sector development. 
a.  Pre- and Post-Adjustment Rates of Financial Development  
To this point, the analysis has focused on comparisons between borrowers and 
non-borrowers. However, because growth rates for borrowers are averaged over the 
entire period, it is possible that improvements in their financial indicators occurred prior 
to receiving loans. If World Bank assistance lagged rather then led improvement in 
financial indicators, it would be harder to ascribe a causal interpretation to our results.  
That is, it would seem more likely that the differences we see between borrowers and 
non-borrowers are attributable to characteristics of the countries themselves, rather than 
the financial reform programs they undertook in conjunction with the World Bank.     
Phrased another way, and perhaps a bit crassly, World Bank adjustment loans might have 
been just one of the trappings of successful financial sector reform during this period. 
To test that proposition, Table 6 offers regressions that allow borrowers’ growth 
rates to adjust after receiving their first adjustment loan for financial reform.  More   19
specifically, the ‘pre-adjustment growth rate’ is the estimated coefficient for the time (t) 
variable in equation (1) for countries that borrowed. The ‘post-adjustment change in 
growth rate’ is the coefficient for a time variable equal to the number of years since a 
country received its first loan. The coefficient on the post-adjustment dummy is, 
therefore, the change in the growth rate relative to its pre-adjustment level.  For example, 
in model 6.9, the post-adjustment coefficient indicates that Cash/M2 declined by an 
additional 4.6% per year, over and above the 1.9% average annual decline enjoyed 
throughout the period.
18  
The results for Cash/M2 are typical of those for the other indicators.  This ‘before 
and after’ analysis thus reveals that the pace of improvement became more rapid after the 
inception of a World Bank adjustment program.  Interest spreads were actually climbing 
at a rate of 8% per year in the typical borrowing country prior to receiving an adjustment 
loan.
19 Afterwards, they declined by 5% per year (8% pre-adjustment growth – 13% post-
adjustment change).  Pre-adjustment growth rates for M2/GDP and private credit/GDP 
were not significantly different from zero; post-adjustment gains were about 6% per year 
for both indicators.  The only exception to the pattern is concentration, which was 
declining at the same rate for borrowing countries before and after receiving adjustment 
loans.  However, taken together the results in Table 6 indicate a strong link between the 
timing of adjustment loans and improvements in financial indicators. 
This is not to suggest that all adjustment loans for financial reform were 
successful.  For macroeconomic structural adjustment loans, Easterly (2005) points out 
that the repetition of loans to a given country is itself a sign that such lending was not 
effective, “One might expect that it would take more than one loan to accomplish 
‘adjustment,’ but it is hard to see why it would take such a large number.”
20  In our 
sample as well, countries received as a many as six adjustment loans with financial sector 
reform components from 1991 to 2002.  We therefore include the cumulative number of 
adjustment loans for financial reform as a regressor in panel B of Table 6.  Whereas 
Easterly found no robust positive links between repetition of loans and macroeconomic 
                                                 
18 Thus, the average post-adjustment decline in cash/M2 was –6.5% (-1.9% + -4.6%). 
19 Again, this is a percent change rather than a percentage point change because we are using the logs of the 
financial indicators as dependent variables in Table 6. 
20 p. 6.   20
outcomes, we actually find a negative relation between the number of adjustment loans 
and multiple financial development indicators (M2/GDP, private credit/GDP, and 
Cash/M2).  However, the inclusion of the cumulative loans variable does not change the 
pre- and post-adjustment growth rates described above.  Taking into account that multiple 
loans to a single country were a sign of past reform failures, the typical borrowing 
country saw significant improvement in its rate of financial development after receiving 
its first adjustment loan with components aimed at financial sector reform.    
 
b.  Regional Effects, Latin America 
One might still be concerned that the relatively positive outcomes for countries 
that borrowed from the World Bank is driven by a specific subset of countries.  For 
example, the results could be driven by the transition economies whose financial sectors 
were starting from a low base, and whose reform experiences were likely atypical.  We 
lack enough data from each region to run separate regional regressions.  We do, however, 
have enough data to re-estimate our models on countries from the Latin-America and 
Carribean (LAC) region.  We also can also run models on developing countries outside of 
Latin America.  Splitting the sample in this way serves two purposes.  First, the models 
for Latin America illustrate whether the general results hold within a single region whose 
countries have similar cultural origins that are difficult to control for in simple regression 
models.  If so, this suggests that the implied benefits of World Bank assistance are not 
driven by cultural factors (i.e., that some countries and cultures are more likely to have 
both substantial involvement with the World Bank and relatively flourishing financial 
sectors). Second, we can compare the results from LAC with those from the rest of the 
developing world.  If the implied advantages of receiving World Bank assistance are 
similar in the two samples, it suggests that no single region is driving the results, which 
further validates the positive effects of being in the treatment category.    
For all indicators except concentration, Latin American countries that received 
World Bank assistance performed better than those that did not (Table 7).  For each of 
those indicators, there is at least one specification where the estimated growth rate for 
borrowing countries is significantly larger than for non-borrowers.  In two models for 
Cash/M2 (7.8, 7.9) and one for interest spreads (7.10), the growth rates for borrowers and   21
non-borrowers are statistically indistinguishable, but the coefficient is significant for 
borrowing countries and insignificant for non-borrowers.  These cases, too, indicate that 
borrowers out-performed non-borrowers.  
In developing countries outside Latin America, the trend was toward better 
developed banking sectors.  Except for interest spreads, growth rates are significantly 
different from zero in the direction consistent with a stronger banking sector for both 
countries that received World Bank adjustment loans and those that did not.  In Latin 
America, non-borrower performance was less consistent across indicators.  However, as 
in Latin America, World Bank borrowers’ improvements on the indicators tended to be 
larger than those for non-borrowers.  For M2/GDP, Cash/M2, and banking concentration, 
estimated changes are significantly larger than for non-borrowers in at least one 
specification.  Interest spreads actually widened for non-borrowers, while showing no 
change for borrowers, another indication that the relative performance of borrowers was 
better.   
   The exception to this pattern is for private credit/GDP, which grew more slowly 
among borrowers than non-borrowers.  Private credit growth among borrowers was also 
slower than growth in M2/GDP.  By contrast, in Latin American countries that received 
loans and in non-borrower countries (both within and outside Latin America), the private 
credit ratio grew more rapidly than the M2 ratio.  Consistent with the observation that 
such rapid growth in private credit can be destabilizing, since 1990 Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) document systemic or borderline banking sector crises in ten of the twenty Latin 
American countries that enter our regressions, with estimated costs greater than eighteen 
percent of GDP in four cases.   
  To summarize, the results for LAC countries indicate that, within a single region, 
financial sector development in countries that borrowed from the World Bank was more 
pronounced than in those that did not.  The results for non-LAC developing countries 
also indicate that borrowing countries did better, and the coefficients and significance 
levels are generally similar to those for LAC borrowers.  This pattern strongly suggests 
that no single country or region is driving our main findings.   22
  7. Conclusion 
Using a unique new dataset on World Bank adjustment loans that supported 
financial sector reform from 1992 to 2003, we offer evidence that borrowing countries 
did better than non-borrowers on multiple measures of banking sector development 
including M2/GDP, interest spreads, and Cash/M2.  These results are found in both panel 
regressions that incorporate fixed-country effects and in cross-sectional regressions that 
use average growth in financial indicators over the full period for each country as 
dependent variables.  The cross-sectional regressions indicate that the panel results are 
not driven by multiple observations from the same country that can artificially drive 
down standard errors. 
Results for private credit/GDP and banking sector concentration are less favorable 
for borrowers. For concentration, results strongly favor neither borrowers nor non-
borrowers. Moreover, recent evidence indicates that concentration measures are not 
robustly linked to financial development and stability.  For private credit, concerns are 
more valid, in part because borrowing countries appear to have performed worse than 
non-borrowers. 
Because the sample of borrowing countries is non-random, we offer a series of 
models that try to account for potential selection effects.  We use non-linear selection 
equations to capture concepts from the political economy literature on IFI relations with 
development countries.  In a crude way, we can therefore account for countries that prefer 
not to borrow from those institutions because they are relatively self-sufficient, and those 
that the IFI’s prefer not to deal with because reform is unlikely to be successful. When 
we address selection in this way using treatment effects regressions, borrowing countries 
had private credit growth rates significantly larger than non-borrowers. Propensity score 
matching techniques also indicate that private credit grew more quickly in borrowing 
countries, though the result is not significant.  For M2/GDP and cash/M2, borrowers 
performed significantly better than non-borrowers on at least one of the tests (propensity 
matching or treatment effects).  Borrowers appear to have done less well on interest 
spreads than the other indicators when we account for selection, but that could be 
attributable to lost observations.   23
Finally, we offer robustness checks indicating that our results are not driven by a 
single region, and that improvements in financial indicators did in fact occur after the 
inception of adjustment lending, even when we control for the adverse selection effects 
associated with repeated lending to the same country. Taken in their entirety, these results 
suggest that the World Bank adjustment loans studied here did have a positive effect on 
financial sector outcomes. At the least, it would be difficult to conclude that such 
involvement was a net detriment for borrowers.  
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Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 








Growth Rate   Equal to the year minus 1991.  Estimated coefficient measures the yearly 
growth rate for the dependent variable in question.  6.68 7  12  1 
Policy Variables 
 




Cumulative number of adjustment loans by the country in question at time t. In 
some models, the total also includes loans for technical assistance. 
0.66  0 6 0 
Bank Privatization (# loans)  Number of adjustment  loans with an emphasis on bank privatization.  0.21  0  3  0 










Other Banking (#)   Number of adjustment loans with an emphasis on banking reform other than 





























General Financial Sector Reform(#)  Number of adjustment loans with an emphasis on general financial sector 



















Microfinance (#)  Number of adjustment loans with an emphasis on development of microfinance.  0.004  0  1  0 

























Claims on the private sector (IFS line 22d) divided by GDP (IFS line 99b). 
25.1% 17.7%  158.5% 0.0% 
M2/GDP  Money (IFS line 34) plus quasi-money (IFS line 35) divided by GDP (IFS line 
99b).  33.2% 26.9%  148.2%  0.002% 
Cash/M2  Currency outside deposit money banks (IFS line 14a) divided by M2 (IFS line 34 
+ line 35).  23.1% 19.4% 82.5%  0.0% 
Interest Rate Spread  Lending rate (IFS line 60l) minus deposit rate (IFS line 60p), multiplied by 100. 
11.4% 8.6%  163.5%  -6.9% 
Concentration  Share of total banking sector assets held by the top 3 largest banks (based on 










Proxy for institutional development. CPIA is the Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment done annually by the World Bank to assess the quality of a country’s 
present policy and institutional framework.  The index is based on twenty criteria, 
which are grouped in four clusters: economic management; structural policies; 














Surplus (-Deficit)/GDP  Overall budget balance, including grants, as a % of GDP (From World 
Development Indicators).  -2.72% -2.11% 10.26%  -31.63% 
GDP Growth  GDP growth (annual %). (From World Development Indicators).  3.00% 3.94%  106.3%  -50.2% 
Inflation  Inflation, GDP deflator, annual %. (From World Development Indicators). 78.1%  9.41%  6041.6%  -25.2% 





 CHECKS  equals one if a country has a legislature or executive that is not 
competitively elected. It is blank if there is no chief executive.  It is incremented 
by one for each of the following cases: if there is a chief executive, if the chief 
executive is competively elected, and if the opposition controls the legisture.  In 
addition, in presidential systems CHECKS is incremented by one for each 
chamber of the legislature UNLESS the president’s party has a majority in the 
lower house AND a closed list system is in effect (implying stronger presidential 
control of his/her party, and therefore of the legislature), and for each party coded 
as allied with the president’s party and which has an ideological (left-right-
center) orientation closer to that of the main opposition party than to that of the 
president’s party.  In parliamentary systems, CHECKS is incremented by one for 
every party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to 
maintain a majority, and for every party in the government coalition that has a 
position on economic issues (right-left-center) closer to the largest opposition 
party than to the party of the executive.  In parliamentary systems, the prime 
minister’s party is not counted as a check if there is a closed rule in place – the 
prime minister is presumed in this case to control the party fully. 
 (From Beck et al., 2003) 
2.65 2.50 10.1  1 
Debt  External debt as a % of GNI.  Averaged, 1970-89. (From World Development 
Indicators)  56.2% 48.1%  222.2% 4.0% 
IMF Credit  Use of IMF Credit in millions of constant $US. Averaged, 1970-89. (From World 
Development Indicators)   462.0 93.5  9370.0 0.0 
Debt Service  Total debt service as a % of GNI. Averaged, 1990-1999. (From World 
Development Indicators)  5.3% 4.2% 0.3%  20.3% 
Capital Formation  Gross fixed capital formation (as a % of GDP), 1990-1999. (From World 
Development Indicators)  22.3% 21.0%  6.9%  64.8% 
Note: Figures calculated over all observations for which at least one dependent variable is non-missing.  30
Table 2: Base Results, Fixed Effects Panel Regression 
  M2/GDP Private  Credit/GDP Cash/M2 Interest  Spread  Concentration 
  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10  2.11  2.12  2.13  2.14  2.15 
Growth Rates     































No WB Adjustment Loans  .760***  1.65*** 1.65*** 1.02*** 1.65*** 1.66*** -0.25*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -.006  -0.18 -0.19 -2.33*** -2.16*** -2.15***
 (.127)  (.211) (.207) (.148) (.261) (.250) (.071) (.110) (.107) (.213)  (0.59) (0.59) (0.24) (0.39) (0.39)
Macro/Institutional Controls     
CPIA Score    -.578 -.892 2.34*** 2.52** -0.60 -0.51  3.50* 2.50 -2.94* -2.51
   (.950) (0.95) (1.09) (1.08) (0.55) (0.55)  (2.03) (2.10) (1.54) (1.57)
Surplus (-Deficit)/GDP    -.193 -.120 .283* .196 -.249*** -.275***   -1.49*** -1.76*** -.027 .012
   (.146) (.151) (.163) (.164) (.081) (.083)  (0.32) (0.34) (.252) (.270)
GDP Growth    -.175** -.150* .039 .094 -.032 -.024   .209 .275 -.154 -.198
   (.089) (.088) (.106) (.103) (.049) (.049)  (.193) (.197) (.147) (.149)
Inflation   -.003*** -.003** -.003* -.003* .002*** .003***   .034*** .036*** -.011 -.016*
   (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001)  (.011) (.012) (.009) (.010)
M2/GDP    .098 .125 -.291*** -.322***
    (.122) (.131) (.097) (.102)
Policy Variables     
Bank Privatization (# loans) 











Regulation, Supervision (#)   3.74** -7.20*** 0.13   7.67* -3.77
   (1.81) (2.15) (1.09)  (4.36) (3.28)
Other Banking (#)     -2.94* .444 2.18**   -7.90* 4.20
   (1.74) (2.05) (1.01)  (4.06) (3.14)
Auditing, Accounting Reform (#)    1.41 3.11 -4.23**   -6.26 11.88**
   (3.63) (3.59) (1.68)  (8.42) (5.01)
Capital Market Development (#)    1.01 3.12* 0.50   -2.09 -2.74
   (1.39) (1.67) (0.81)  (2.93) (2.11)
General Financial Sector (#)    -.742 -1.40 -0.58   -5.54 3.29
Reform   (1.43) (1.71) (0.86)  (3.47) (2.41)
Rural Finance (#)    8.50** 7.77* 0.69   -2.50 -2.77
   (3.49) (4.17) (1.89)  (9.01) (5.13)
Microfinance  (#)   1.56 -6.20 5.78***  .298 -3.81
   (3.95) (4.72) (2.59)   (10.21) (7.77)
Non-Bank Financial Sector (#)    2.37 3.21 -4.54***   10.95* 0.96
Institutions   (2.79) (3.34) (1.88)  (6.25) (3.86)
Constant 27.28***  27.77*** 27.93*** 20.19*** 12.66*** 14.14*** 24.48*** 25.35*** 25.78*** 13.68***  -1.41 -1.09 80.28*** 90.48*** 89.65***
  (.550) (3.13) (3.20) (.643) (3.70) (3.63) (0.33) (1.84) (1.84) (0.96) (7.72) (8.14) (1.12) (5.79) (5.99)

































All models include country fixed effects.  Standard errors are within parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. All policy  and control  
variables are lagged one year. Loans devoted solely to microfinance are deleted from the database.  There were no adjustment loans focused on SME finance, so that  
variable does not appear in the table.  When loans for technical assistance are included in the database, the SME variable does enter the model. Shading indicates coefficients 
differ at the ten percent level of statistical significance or better.    31
 
Table 3: Fixed Effects Panel Regressions, Results Expressed in Percentage Terms 
  Log(M2/GDP) Log(Private  Credit/GDP) Log(Cash/M2)  Log(Interest Spread)  Log(Concentration) 
  3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10  3.11  3.12  3.13  3.14  3.15 
Growth Rates     
    































No WB Adjustment Loans  .014***  .031*** .031*** .037*** .063*** .064*** -.017*** -.022*** -.022*** .015  .015 .014 -.036*** -029*** -.029***
  (.005)  (..005) (.005) (.007) (.009) (.009) (.004) (.005) (.005) (.010)  (.018) (.019) (.004) (.008) (.008)
Macro/Institutional Controls 
Included?  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Policy Variables  
Included?  No  No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant  3.13*** 3.23*** 3.20*** 2.63*** 2.35*** 2.37*** 3.03*** 3.07*** 3.09*** 2.11*** 1.44*** 1.42*** 4.35*** 4.65*** 4.62***
  (.021) (.074) (.074) (..032) (.132) (.135) (.018) (.091) (.094) (0.04) (0.24) (0.26) (0.02) (0.11) (0.12)

































All models include country fixed effects.  Standard errors are within parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. All policy  and control  
variables are lagged one year. Loans devoted solely to microfinance are deleted from the database.  There were no adjustment loans focused on SME finance, so that  
variable is not among the policy controls.  Shading indicates coefficients differ at the ten percent level of statistical significance or better.   32
 
Table 4: Cross Sectional Regressions, OLS and Treatment Effects 
  Avg. Growth M2/GDP 
Avg. Growth Private 

















































































































































Constant  .957*** .987*** .944*** 1.05*** .953*** .950*** 1.07*** .984*** 1.00*** 1.06** 1.08*** 1.59*** 1.04*** 1.02*** 1.10***
  (.035) (.010) (.031) (.079) (.018) (.055) (.045) (.021) (.035) (.515) (.141) (.283) (.035) (.015) (.038)
Selection Equation     
External Debt 1970-89     -.034* -.030* -.018 -.005 -035 -.018   -.019 -.011 -.032** -.026*
(% of GDP)    (.018) (.017) (.011) (.005) (.022) (.017)   (.035) (.034) (.014) (.014)
External Debt Squared    .0003** .0003* .0001 .00004** .0003* .0001  .0002 .0002 .0002** .0002*
   (.0001) (.0001) (00008) (.00002) (.0002) (.0002)  (.0003) (.0003) (.0001) (.0001)
# Governmental Checks    .210 .176 .234 .258 .478 .616*   .260 .239 .622* .433
   (.228) (.237) (.145) (.170) (.315) (.357)  (.538) (.483) (.344) (.364)
Checks  Squared   -.050 -.046 -.035* -.034 -.089** -.097  -.056 -.047 .096 -.073
   (.034) (.034) (.020) (.024) (.045) (.061)  (.081) (.069) (.060) (.057)
IMF Borrowing 1970-89    .0015** .0014** .00084* .0006 .0017** .0015**   .0013 .0014* .0010
(Constant $ millions)    (.0006) (.0006) (.00045) (.0005) (.0008) (0007)  (.0010) (.0007) (.0007)
Constant   .608 .532 .137 -.233 .140 -.412   -.061 -.089 .151 .230















Wald Chi Square 































LR test of independent eqns 






















Standard errors are within parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. All policy and control variables (CPIA, inflation, growth, deficits/GDP, M2/GDP) are averaged 
over 1991-2000.   External debt and IMF borrowing are annual averages taken from 1970-1989.  The number of governmental checks is taken from Beck et al. (2001).   33
 
Table 5: Propensity Score Matching Models 
Panel A. 

















World  Bank  Sample  3.43 -2.36 2.69 18.6 24.4 1.04 1.03 0.98 1.01 0.97 
Non-World  Bank  3.22 -1.30 3.93  8.3  30.4 1.03 1.03 0.99 1.03 0.98 




Propensity Score Matching Equation: 










**DEBT SERVICE + 9.90
*GROWTH IN CAPITAL FORMATION + 1.08 IMF BORROWING 
                          (6.02)            (0.86)          (.055)                      (.0005)           (.095)                                (5.91)                                                                     (0.77) 
88 observations, pseudo r-squared 0.17 
  Estimated Probability of Receiving World Bank Loan Based on Observables  
 











































































Received WB  .021**  .020***  -.001  .029 -.028**  -.035***  -.061  -.124 .011 .012 
Loan  (.008) (.007) (.026) (.026) (.012) (.011) (.109) (.075) (.011) (.011) 
CPIA  .013 .013* -.001 -.001 -.008  .009 -.025 -.213  -.019*  -.031*** 
  (.009) (.007) (.021) (.021) (.011) (.012) (.146) (.180) (.010) (.010) 
Growth  .003 .004* -.002  -.0004  -.012***  -.012***  .012 -.014  .001 .0004 
  (.003)  (.0025) (.008) (.007) (.003) (.003) (.024) (.016) (.002)  (.0017) 
Inflation  .0001 .0001 .0002 .0003  -.0004  .00001  .00017 .0001  -.00005  -.00005 
  (.0001) (.0001) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)  (.00006)  (.00014) (.0002)  (.00004)  (.00004) 
Surplus(-Deficit)/  -.001  -.0004  -.001 .005 .001  -.002  -.015  -.035* .002  .0035 
GDP  (.002)  (.0016) (.003) (.006) (.002) (.003) (.018) (.020) (.002)  (.0022) 
M2/GDP         .001  .005  .0001  -.0001 
         (.002)  (.003)  (.0003)  (.0002) 
Constant  0.957***  0.957*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.01***  1.06** 1.59*** 1.04*** 1.08*** 
  (.035) (.026) (.079) (.077) (.045) (.040) (.515) (.553) (.035) (.030) 
Observations  74 93 76 94 78 90 50 56 67 86 
r-squared  0.15 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.32 0.40 0.02 0.22 0.06 0.15 
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Table 6: Fixed Effects Panel Regressions, Growth Rates Pre and Post Adjustment Lending 
  Log(M2/GDP) Log(Private  Credit/GDP) Log(Cash/M2)  Log(Interest Spread)  Log(Concentration) 
  6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.10  6.11  6.12  6.13  6.14  6.15 
Panel A.
Growth Rates     
    































Post-Adjustment Change  .020  .054*** .059*** .023 .047*** .058*** -.008 -.032** -.046*** -.038 -.132*** -.129*** -.001 -.001 .010
in Growth Rate  (.013)  (.012) (.012) (.018) (.018) (.019) (.010) (.013) (.014) (.026) (.031) (.034) (.012) (.020) (.021)
Macro/Institutional Controls 
Included?  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Policy Variables  
Included?  No  No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant  3.02*** 3.27*** 3.20*** 2.55*** 2.64*** 2.59*** 3.15*** 3.11*** 3.11*** 2.17*** 1.51*** 1.61*** 4.33*** 4.49*** 4.51***
  (.042) (.102) (.095) (.061) (.162) (.158) (.031) (.125) (.124) (.086) (.310) (.326) (.041) (.148) (.152)


































Growth Rates     
    































Post-Adjustment Change  .024  .063*** .062*** .026 .058*** .062*** -.034*** -.050*** -.054*** -.025  -.134** -.130*** .003 .005 .013
in Growth Rate  (.015)  (.012) (.011) (.021) (.020) (.019) (.012) (.014) (.013) (.030)  (.033) (.034) (.013) (.021) (.021)
Cumulative Adjustment Loans  -.016  -.042** -.205*** -.001 -.048 -.122* .111*** .091*** .200*** .020  .009 .030 -.015 -.019 -.065
  (.023) (.019) (.035) (.035) (.034) (.067) (.020) (.024) (.050) (.042) (.045) (.101) (.018) (.022) (.049)
Macro/Institutional Controls 
Included?  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Policy Variables  
Included?  No  No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant  3.02*** 3.24*** 3.10*** 2.56*** 2.61*** 2.55*** 3.17*** 3.16*** 3.16*** 2.27*** 1.53*** 1.61*** 4.33*** 4.48*** 4.50***
  (.045) (.102) (.092) (.065) (.163) (.160) (.038) (.124) (.122) (.097) (.315) (.327) (.041) (.148) (.152)

































All models include country fixed effects.  Standard errors are within parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. All policy  and control  
variables are lagged one year. Loans devoted solely to microfinance are deleted from the database.  There were no adjustment loans focused on SME finance, so that  
variable does not appear in the table.  When loans for technical assistance are included, the SME variable does enter the model. Shading indicates coefficients differ at the ten 
percent level of statistical significance or better.   35
Table 7: Regional Fixed Effects Panel Regressions, Latin America Versus Rest of Developing World 
  Log(M2/GDP) Log(Private  Credit/GDP) Log(Cash/M2)  Log(Interest Spread)  Log(Concentration) 
  7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10  7.11  7.12  7.13  7.14  7.15 
Latin America     
Growth Rates     
    































No WB Adjustment Loans  .014***  .011 .014* .038*** .031*** .033*** -.020 -.023 -.025 -.008  -.006 -.011 -.060*** -.027 -.023
  (.005)  (.008) (.008) (.007) (.011) (.010) (.012) (.022) (.022) (.013)  (.027) (.026) (.012) (.026) (.026)
Macro/Institutional Controls 
Included?  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Policy Variables  
Included?  No  No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant  3.22*** 3.11*** 3.16*** 2.85*** 2.79*** 2.75*** 2.72*** 2.74*** 2.64*** 2.47*** 2.14*** 2.06*** 4.26*** 4.44*** 4.53***
  (.024) (.120) (.116) (.033) (.172) (.151) (.049) (.323) (.346) (.060) (.292) (.287) (.049) (.235) (.243)

































Developing Countries Outside 
Latin America     
Growth Rates     
    































No WB Adjustment Loans  .012**  .013*** .012*** .034*** .033*** .032*** -.016*** -.010** -.009** .028**  .031** .031** -.030*** -.029*** -.029***
  (.006)  (.004) (.004) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.012)  (.013) (.012) (.004) (.005) (.005)
Macro/Institutional Controls 
Included?  No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Policy Variables  
Included?  No  No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Constant  3.16*** 3.28*** 3.20*** 2.55*** 2.41*** 2.32*** 3.11*** 3.28*** 3.32*** 1.90*** 1.53*** 1.57*** 4.38*** 4.48*** 4.45***
  (.025) (.067) (.066) (.038) (.120) (.122) (.018) (.068) (.068) (.055) (.243) (.255) (.021) (.101) (.105)

































All models include country fixed effects.  Standard errors are within parentheses. *,**,*** indicates significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. All policy  and control  
variables are lagged one year. Macroecnomic controls do not include surplus(-deficit)/GDP because its inclusion reduced the available number of observations by half.  Loans 
devoted solely to microfinance are deleted from the database.  There were no adjustment loans focused on SME finance, so that variable is not among the policy controls.  Shading 
indicates coefficients differ at the ten percent level of statistical significance or better.   36
















































































































Note:  The 106 countries in this table are those that appear in any of the regressions.  The maximum number of countries in any single 
regression is 98. 